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) STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ANTHONY IMBRIALE, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-18670 
UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, LOCAL 1440, 
Respondent, 
- and -
STATEN ISLAND RAPID TRANSIT 
OPERATING AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CHARLES MUNAFO, for Charging Party 
COSTA, McKAY & DONNELLY (RICHARD A. McKAY of counsel), for 
Respondent 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, GENERAL COUNSEL (EDWARD ZAGAJESKI of 
counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Charles J. Munafo to a decision by 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rendered on an improper practice charge filed by 
Anthony Imbriale against the United Transportation Union, Local 1440 (UTU) and the 
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Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Authority (SIRTOA). Munafo appeared as 
Imbriale's representative at the pre-hearing conference. The parties were thereafter 
notified by the ALJ that a hearing was scheduled on the charge as limited to an 
allegation that UTU had improperly denied Imbriale two union representatives in 
conjunction with a grievance. Without notice, both Imbriale and Munafo failed to appear 
at the scheduled hearing attended by the other parties and counsel. The ALJ dismissed 
the charge and ordered Munafo to pay attorney's fees and costs to UTU and SIRTOA 
and to pay the agency for expenses it incurred as a result of Imbriale's and Munafo's 
failure to attend the hearing. The ALJ held that Munafo was Imbriale's representative 
and he was properly held accountable financially for an act that was "part of a willful 
pattern designed to harass the litigants . . . [demonstrating] contumacious disrespect for 
the Board." 
Munafo appeals from the ALJ's order requiring him to pay the costs and fees 
because he alleges that he was not serving as Imbriale's representative after the pre-
hearing conference. SIRTOA argues that the ALJ's sanctions against Munafo were 
appropriate for the reasons stated in the ALJ's decision because Munafo never 
informed the ALJ or the parties that he was no longer Imbriale's representative. 
Having considered the arguments raised, we rescind the ALJ's order because 
the ALJ's order was issued in a manner contrary to our governing statutory and 
regulatory scheme.1 
1For purposes of this decision, we assume, without deciding, that Munafo was Imbriale's 
representative at the date of the hearing. 
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The order entered by the ALJ was not a remedial order issued under §205.5(d) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). Remedial orders issue to address 
violations of the Act committed by an "offending party".2 Munafo was not a party to this 
charge, no violation of the Act was found to have been committed and the charge was 
dismissed. The power to make the order which the ALJ issued against Munafo finds 
arguable basis, however, in §205.5(1) of the Act, which provides that the agency may 
"exercise such other powers, as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes and 
provisions of this article." We may again assume, without deciding, that this provision of 
the Act empowers the agency to sanction financially parties or representatives who 
engage in misconduct. We conclude, however, that the power to sanction is not 
appropriately exercised through an order issued against a party representative under a 
dismissed improper practice charge. 
Our regulatory scheme permits for an appeal from an ALJ's decision and order 
by a party only.3 The absence of a right to appeal by party representatives is 
persuasive evidence that orders of any kind were never intended to be issued as 
against party representatives in the context of an improper practice charge. Orders in 
improper practice proceedings are properly entered only against the parties to those 
proceedings as only parties may appeal from those orders under our Rules. 
In the final analysis, the ALJ sanctioned Munafo for willful misconduct. The order 
entered, however, creates a method for the investigation and punishment of misconduct 
2Act §205.5(d). 
3Rules of Procedure (Rules) §204.10. We have considered Munafo's "exceptions" in 
recognition that there must be some means by which Munafo can challenge the ALJ's 
order. 
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despite our already having a rule directed specifically to party or representative 
misconduct.4 That rule was recently endorsed by the legislature as the means by which 
representatives are to be sanctioned for misconduct.5 That rule was used to bar 
Munafo from appearing before the agency in a representative capacity due to his 
misconduct at and after the conference held in this very case.6 We believe that our 
long-standing misconduct rule is the exclusive means by which sanctions of any type 
can be imposed against a party representative for misconduct. 
An investigation pursuant to existing rule is not only the procedure which must be 
used to determine whether a party representative has engaged in misconduct of some 
type and, if so, what the sanction for that misconduct should be, it is the procedure best 
suited to that end. Improper practice charges are the means by which the agency 
determines whether a party respondent has violated the Act and the means by which 
nonpunitive remedies for the violations as committed by those parties are fashioned. 
The misconduct investigation we would be conducting pursuant to the ALJ's order would 
have nothing whatever to do with questions concerning alleged violations of law and the 
appropriate remedies for those violations. In contrast, the very purpose of our 
misconduct rule is to investigate alleged misconduct by a party or representative during 
the adjudication of an improper practice charge and to decide upon the appropriate 
sanction for any misconduct found. That rule is targeted specifically to party 
4Rules §204.7Q). 
5Act §205.50). 
6Matter of Munafo. 31 PERB 1J3012 (1998). 
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representatives and to the type of actions by them which the ALJ in this case held 
warranted sanction. It is that rule, focused as to person, conduct and result, which 
must and should be used to investigate allegations of a party representative's 
misconduct, not improper practice charges. 
In rescinding the ALJ's order, we do not condone Munafo's conduct. Even if, as 
Munafo claims, he was not Imbriale's representative after the conference, 
circumstances warranted that he so notify the parties and the ALJ, all of whom 
assumed that Munafo was Imbriale's representative. We simply conclude that an 
improper practice charge cannot and should not serve as the basis to investigate and 
reach conclusions about a representative's alleged misconduct, nor as the basis to 
impose an order to remedy or sanction that misconduct, whether directly or indirectly. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's order requiring Munafo to pay costs 
and fees is rescinded. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: September 28, 1998 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
"MarcA>^fe6tt^v!ember / 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-18437 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DIVISION FOR YOUTH), 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (DAREN J. RYLEWICZ of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on CSEA's charge against the State of New York 
(Division for Youth)1 (DFY) (State). CSEA alleges that the State violated §209-a.1 (d) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when the State stopped permitting 
DFY employees to serve as foster parents for children placed with DFY. After a 
hearing, the ALJ dismissed the charge. The ALJ concluded that the State's interest in 
J 1The Division for Youth has since been restructured and renamed the "Office of 
Children and Family Services". 
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avoiding potential conflicts of interest outweighed the employees' interests in serving as 
foster parents for children placed under DFY's custody and control. The ALJ held, 
therefore, that the State's admitted unilateral action was an exercise of managerial 
prerogative affecting a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in striking a balance of 
interests exempting the State from a duty to negotiate its decision to prohibit DFY unit 
employees from serving as foster parents for children under DFY's supervision. CSEA 
argues that this "work rule" is a mandatorily negotiable subject under established 
precedent, which the ALJ misapplied. 
The State argues in response that CSEA's exceptions are not supported by the 
record and that the ALJ's findings and conclusions are correct and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's dismissal of the charge under different analysis. 
In our view, the State's decision to disallow DFY employees from serving as 
foster parents for children placed within DFY's custody and control is not properly 
characterized as a work rule or any other term or condition of the employees' 
employment which might be subject to a decisional bargaining obligation under the Act. 
A work rule is a determination or pronouncement made by an employer in its 
employer capacity, directed to employees as employees, which affects the employees' 
delivery of employment services and carries with it the explicit or implicit threat of 
discipline or other employment consequence for noncompliance. Similarly, an 
employer's action other than that which might be considered a work rule must at the 
least implicate some aspect of the employees' employment relationship before it can be 
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considered a term and condition of employment within the meaning of the Act. The 
State's action at issue does not have any of these characteristics. 
Determinations regarding the persons who are eligible to be foster parents for 
children under DFY's supervision are not ones which the State made in its capacity as 
employer. Rather, they are determinations made by the State in its sovereign capacity 
as custodian of children who have been determined by the judiciary to be in need of 
assistance and supervision. The State's disqualification of DFY employees from 
participation in the foster care program for children placed under DFY's care did not 
affect a single aspect of any employee's employment relationship. Foster care 
arrangements are not at all employment related. Nor is the disqualification effected or 
enforced through any aspect of the employment relationship. Children within DFY's 
care are simply no longer placed in foster care arrangements with DFY employees. 
That unit employees may have derived some tangible or intangible benefit from 
serving as foster care parents is immaterial to an analysis of the negotiability of the 
State's decision. Whatever benefits employees derived from their service as foster care 
parents did not flow to them as an attribute of their employment with the State, even 
indirectly. The benefits flowed to them only in their capacity as foster care parents and 
solely from their voluntary participation in a program which was entirely divorced from 
their employment relationship. 
In applying a balancing test, the ALJ relied upon New York State Thruway 
Authority (hereinafter Thruway Authority).2 In that case, the Thruway Authority had 
) 
221 PERB 1J4570, affd, 21 PERB fl3058 (1988). 
Board - U-18437 -4 
promulgated an "Executive Instruction" pursuant to which employees in a unit title were 
not allowed to bid at auction on some of its equipment being sold to the public. 
Although the issue was not presented to it directly on exceptions, the Board in its 
decision appears to have endorsed the ALJ's conclusion that the Thruway Authority's 
"rule" involved a "term and condition of employment" because "the prohibition, the 
essence of the rule, derives solely from the employment relationship."3 The Thruway 
Authority's "rule" does not appear to have had any more relationship to the employees' 
employment than the alleged "work rule" in issue here. Our conclusion here is that a 
prohibition on the exercise of a privilege is not necessarily a "term and condition of 
employment" within the meaning of the Act requiring negotiations simply and solely 
because it is employees who have been denied access to the privilege. The analysis 
must go beyond the identity of the persons to whom the prohibition is directed to 
include consideration of such factors as the capacity in which the government has 
issued the "rule" and its effect upon and its relationship to the employer-employee 
relationship. We reverse Thruway Authority to the extent the rationale in that case is 
inconsistent with our decision herein because Thruway Authority incorrectly states how 
the negotiability of a given subject is to be analyzed. Therefore, we have no occasion 
to consider CSEA's argument that the State's cited conflicts of interest are not 
substantial or its claim that the State's concerns could be addressed by alternatives 
other than a disqualification of DFY employees from participation in the foster care 
program for DFY children. The State's decision to disqualify DFY employees from 
321 PERB 1J4570, at 4680 (1988). 
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service as foster parents for DFY youth is not a term and condition of employment 
within the meaning of the Act by its very nature on any theory. 
As a second ground for dismissal of this charge, we hold that the State's decision 
was not a change in practice cognizable under a refusal to bargain charge. All foster 
.care_Placements are made by the State under the standard of the "best interest of the 
child". That standard vests foster care placements within the discretion of the State. 
When the State decided that children in DFY's custody were not best served by having 
DFY employees be their foster parents and then disqualified DFY employees from 
participation in the foster care program for that reason, its action was entirely consistent 
with the State's prevailing policy or practice. Service as a foster parent was not 
guaranteed to anyone, whether or not an employee. Placements were always 
conditioned upon the State's initial and continuing determination that the best interests 
of the child would be thereby served. The State has reassessed its prior placement 
policy and changed it to coincide with what it now believes to be the children's best 
interests. Disqualification of DFY employees pursuant to that policy reassessment 
simply did not change a practice because the practice was conditional from inception 
and the State's action was taken consistently with that condition.4 This charge, 
therefore, must be dismissed even if the State's decision were held to embrace a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. 
4State of New York (Governor's Office of Employee Relations and Dep't of 
Health), 25 PERB 1J3005 (1992), cont'd, 195 A.D.2d 930, 26 PERB 1J7008 (3d Dep't 
1993). 
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For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's exceptions are denied and the ALJ's 
decision ordering the charge dismissed is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
'DATEDTSeptember28/f998~ 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Charging Party, 
-and"- CASE~NbTlM8503 
STATE OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
GARY D. RUBERTI, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the United University Professions 
(UUP) and the State of New York (State) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) dismissing UUP's charge alleging that the State violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally transferring outside the 
bargaining unit represented by UUP the professorial duties regarding Germanic 
languages and literature at the State University of New York at Albany (SUNYA). The 
ALJ determined that there was no violation because SUNYA no longer offered German 
language and literature courses and that SUNYA had a long-standing practice of 
allowing its students to take courses at area schools belonging to the Hudson Mohawk 
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Association of Colleges and Universities (Association),1 which were not offered at 
SUNYA. 
UUP excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred as a matter of fact 
and law. The State excepts to the ALJ's declination to determine the import of the 
.partiesijstipulation that the State had ceased to offer any degree programs in German or 
to require students to take German language, but otherwise supports the ALJ's 
decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
As of May 31, 1997, SUNYA ceased offering German language courses, ceased 
requiring students to take German language courses and ceased all German language 
degree programs. Full-time faculty members who taught German language within 
SUNYA's Department of Germanic and Slavic Languages and Literature were 
retrenched and part-time faculty members were not renewed. Students at SUNYA who 
were enrolled as of May 31, 1997 in a German language degree program are allowed to 
take courses through the Association at member colleges and universities to complete 
their degree requirements. Although no new majors in German language may be 
declared, any SUNYA student who meets the Association requirements may take 
German language courses through the Association. 
1SUNYA is a member of the Association, which was chartered in 1970, and is 
made up of 16 colleges and universities in the Capital District. The Association permits 
full-time students who are enrolled in a member school to take courses at another 
member college or university so long as the course is not available to the students at 
their own school. 
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UUP argues that by making German language courses available to SUNYA 
students through the Association, SUNYA has unilaterally reassigned work performed 
exclusively by employees in UUP's unit to nonunit personnel. It is SUNYA's position 
that it has gone out of the business of offering German language courses and that the 
practice of SUNYA's students taking courses not offered at SUNYA at Association 
member colleges and universities and receiving credit at SUNYA is long-standing. 
A public employer generally violates the Act by unilaterally reassigning unit work 
to nonunit personnel when the reassigned work has been performed exclusively by unit 
employees and the reassigned work is substantially similar to the work previously 
performed by unit employees.2 The ALJ did not reach the issue of exclusivity because 
she found that the long-standing practice of making Association course offerings 
available to students was dispositive of the charge.3 Because of our findings, infra, we 
agree that we need not reach the issue of UUP's exclusivity. 
The analysis of this case begins and ends with our finding that SUNYA has 
made a managerial decision to abolish or curtail a service which it previously offered. 
We have long held that it is a managerial prerogative to abolish a service.4 Transfer 
principles have no application to an employer which has gone out of business in whole 
or part. In considering whether a service has actually been abolished or has merely 
been transferred for performance by an agent, we look to the level of control exercised 
2Niagara-FrontierTransp. Auth.. 18 PERB 1J3083 (1985). 
3On two or three occasions, visiting professors taught German language 
courses. Graduate students at SUNYA also taught German language classes to some 
extent. They are not included in UUP's bargaining unit. 
4City Sen. Dist. of the City of New Rochelle, 4 PERB ^3060 (1971). 
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by the public employer.5 If an employer's level of control over the agent is de minimus, 
there is no bargaining obligation.6 
In this case, we find that SUNYA has ceased offering German language courses 
to its students. SUNYA's participation in the Association allows SUNYA students to 
cross-register for courses at member colleges and universities. SUNYA's membership 
fee in the Association does not pay for the costs of registration or instruction of those 
students. The courses do not utilize any of SUNYA's equipment or facilities. SUNYA 
plays no role in the registration procedures, the content of the courses, or the standards 
applied to students. Finally, SUNYA does not require any students to take German 
language courses. The only contact SUNYA now has with the teaching of German 
language courses is its acceptance for credit of course work in German completed at 
one of the Association college or universities. As SUNYA exercises no control over the 
provision of this service by the Association, we find that SUNYA has not merely 
transferred the teaching of German to other colleges and universities. Instead, SUNYA 
is itself no longer in the business of teaching German. Its decision to do so is not 
mandatorily negotiable. That the Association offers the same service, through no 
5See Saratoga Springs Sch. Dist.t 11 PERB 1J3037 (1978), affd, 68 A.D.2d 202, 
12 PERB 1J7008 (3d Dep't 1979), motion for leave to appeal denied. 47 N.Y.2d 711, 
12 PERB ^7012(1979). See also County of Erie (Erie County Med. Ctr.). 28 PERB 
1J3015 (1995); Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of Long Beach. 
26 PERB 1J3065 (1993). 
6Town of Brookhaven, 28 PERB 1J3010 (1995). 
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solicitation by SUNYA,7 does not warrant a contrary conclusion.8 Where a public 
employer has ceased providing a service or a product, the employer's mere willingness 
to accept that service or product which it did not solicit from a third party provider over 
whom it exercises no more than de minimus control does not itself reestablish the 
employer as one in business for purposes of apply ing_c^^ la^^nj r^^ejg^f j jn i t 
work. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny UUP's exceptions and affirm the ALJ's 
dismissal of the charge. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: September 28, 1998 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
7The Association played no role in SUNYA's decision to discontinue its German 
language courses. 
8See Niagara Frontier Metro Sys.. Inc., 30 PERBfl3010 (1997): Town of 
Brookhaven, supra note 6. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WILLIAM W. HINDS II, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4731 




SEIU, LOCAL 200B, 
Intervenor. 
WILLIAM W. HINDS II. pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by William W. Hinds II to a decision of 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
his petition seeking to decertify SEIU, Local 200B (SEIU) as the bargaining agent for a 
unit of employees of the Jamesville-DeWitt Central School District. 
Hinds filed a petition on. November 29, 1997,1 on his behalf and the behalf of 
three other employees in the unit represented by SEIU, seeking to decertify SEIU as 
1A similar petition, Case No. C-4717, was filed on November 5, 1997. It was not 
accompanied by a declaration of authenticity and Hinds was notified that it was 
deficient. It was deemed withdrawn by the Director on December 17, 1997. 
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the bargaining agent. The petition was accompanied by a showing of interest but no 
declaration of authenticity, as required by §201.4(d) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules).2 
Hinds was notified that the petition was deficient because it lacked a declaration of 
authenticity. He was further advised that a new petition would be untimely.3 In 
response to the deficiency notice, Hinds filed a purported declaration of authenticity on 
December 17, 1997. He was thereafter notified that the declaration could not be 
2Section 201.4(d) provides: 
A declaration of authenticity, signed and sworn to before any person 
authorized to administer oaths, shall be filed by the petitioner or movant 
with the director simultaneously with the filing of the showing of interest or 
any evidence of majority status for the purpose of certification without an 
election, pursuant to section 201.9(g)(1) of this Part. Such declaration of 
authenticity shall contain the following: 
(1) the name of the individual executing the declaration, and 
a statement of the declarant's authority to execute it; if on 
behalf of an employee organization, the declarant's position 
with the employee organization, and a statement of the 
declarant's authority to execute the declaration on its behalf; 
and 
(2) a declaration that, upon the declarant's personal 
knowledge, or inquiries that the declarant has made, the 
persons whose names appear upon the evidence submitted 
have themselves signed such evidences on the dates 
specified thereon, the persons specified as current members 
are in fact current members, and, as to any persons whose 
signatures were solicited on or after March 15, 1996, that 
inquiry was made regarding their inclusion in any existing 
negotiating unit which is the subject of the representation 
petition! If the declaration is upon inquiries the declarant 
has made, and not upon the declarant's personal 
knowledge, the declarant shall specify the nature of those 
inquiries. 
3The SEIU-District contract expired on June 30, 1998. Under §201.3(d) of our 
Rules, the petition could have been filed before expiration of that agreement only during 
November 1997. If no new agreement has been reached between SEIU and the 
District after 120 days following expiration of that contract, another petition could be 
filed, pursuant to §201.3(e) of the Rules. 
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accepted because it had not been filed simultaneously with the petition and that a 
petition for decertification would now be untimely. The petition was subsequently 
dismissed by the Director. 
Hinds excepts to the Director's decision, arguing that he did not understand the 
legal processes involved in the filing of a petition for decertification and that he had 
requested assistance in the November 26, 1997 cover letter to the instant petition.4 
The District and SEIU have not responded to either the Director's decision or Hinds' 
exceptions. 
We have consistently held that our Rules regarding the filing of the showing of 
interest should be strictly applied.5 That practice must be followed with regard to the 
requirement that a declaration of authenticity of the showing of interest be filed 
simultaneously with the petition. Hinds failed to file any declaration of authenticity with 
the petition. Such deficiency cannot be cured by a subsequent filing. The dismissal of 
the petition, therefore, was proper. 
That Hinds is inexperienced and unfamiliar with PERB's procedures is not a 
sufficient basis to accept a fatally defective petition or a petition that is untimely filed.6 
The requirement that a declaration of authenticity be filed simultaneously with the 
4Hinds wrote: "If there is a standard form required by PERB to fulfill the 
declaration of authenticity requirements please let me know." There is no such form as 
the requirements for a declaration of authenticity are clearly set forth in §201.4(d) of the 
Rules. 
5New York Convention Ctr. Operating Corp.. 20 PERB 1J3063 (1987). SeeaJSQ 
Town of Amherst. 13 PERB 1J3074 (1980). 
6S££, iL£U, Suffolk County BOCES HI. 25 PERB 1(3020 (1992). 
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showing of interest supporting a petition is not waived by a party's ignorance of it, and 
this Rule has always been strictly enforced.7 
Based on the foregoing, the exceptions are denied and the decision of the 
Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: September 28, 1998 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
Enlarged City Sch. Dist. of the City of Amsterdam. 21 PERB 1J4032, affd, 21 
PERB H3042 (1988). Seealsa Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist.. 12 PERB 1J3040 (1979). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF CARMEL POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
- and - * CASE NO. C-4677 
TOWN OF CARMEL, 
Employer. 
RAYMOND G. KRUSE, ESQ., for Petitioner 
DONOGHUE, THOMAS, AUSLANDER & DROHAN (STUART S. WAXMAN of 
counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) filed, respectively, by the Town of 
Carmel Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA) and the Town of Carmel (Town). 
The PBA petitions to include in its unit the title of lieutenant, which is presently included 
in another unit represented by United Federation of Police (FOP).1 The Director 
dismissed the petition on two grounds. First, that the at-issue employee, Bruce Hart, is 
managerial within the meaning of §201.7(a)(ii) of the Public Employees' Fair 
1FOP declined to intervene in this proceeding, but did not object to the petition. 
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Employment Act (Act). Second, that "lieutenant" is a supervisory title, not appropriately 
included in the PBA's unit consisting of the subordinate titles of patrolman, sergeant, 
detective and detective sergeant. The Director did not consider the Town's alternative 
argument that Hart is appropriately excluded from the PBA's unit because he is a 
confidential employee within the meaning of §201.7(a) of the Act. 
The PBA excepts to the Director's decision in all material respects, arguing that 
his findings of fact and the cases relied upon by him are selectively and erroneously 
described. The Town excepts only to the Director's declination to find Hart to be a 
confidential employee, ineligible for representation in any unit. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
Director's decision on the second stated ground of supervisory conflict. Accordingly, we 
do not consider whether Hart is either managerial or confidential within the meaning of 
the Act. 
The Town in the past has employed at least two lieutenants who have been 
excluded from the PBA's unit for years and included in a separate unit represented by 
FOP, which had a contract with the Town which was current at the date of the PBA's 
petition. The exclusion of lieutenants from the PBA's unit conforms to and confirms 
what is, at least, a clear potential for a conflict of interest were the title of lieutenant to 
be placed into the unit which the PBA represents. 
The lieutenant is the second in command of the department, behind the chief of 
police and, as found and described by the Director, is regularly involved with a wide 
range of traditional supervisory functions. At a level different from others in the PBA's 
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unit and with a frequency greater than that required of those others, Hart administers 
the PBA contract, adjusts grievances arising thereunder, directs and schedules staff, 
fashions work orders, approves overtime and equipment purchases, and participates in 
the hiring and disciplinary processes. 
The uniting history, the Town's administrative convenience and the breadth of 
the lieutenant's supervisory functions all militate against the inclusion of the title of 
lieutenant in the PBA's unit.2 The only factor favoring PBA's petition, and the one which 
may have prompted it, is that Hart may be the only police lieutenant currently employed 
by the Town. Assuming, contrary to both the Director's finding and the Town's 
argument, that Hart is a covered employee, he is potentially denied representation 
rights unless and until there are other persons employed in the same or comparable 
supervisory or administrative titles. But even if Hart is currently the only person 
employed in the lieutenant's title, this only means that the Town's bargaining obligation 
to FOP is suspended until that unit includes two employees.3 The unit itself remains 
intact and FOP is not rendered defunct simply because only one lieutenant may be 
currently employed. 
We should not disturb an existing unit structure when the uniting requested by a 
petitioner, as here, hinges on nothing more than the timing of its petition. A uniting that 
we would deny as inappropriate if there were two lieutenants employed should not 
2Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of Buffalo. 14 PERB 1J3051 (1981); 
New York State Div. of State Police, 1 PERB H399.32 (1968); Village of Waverly, 21 
PERB 1J4060 (1988). 
3See Auburn Indus. Dev. Auth., 15 PERB p i 3 9 (1982). 
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become a uniting request granted simply because there is only one lieutenant 
employed when the petition is filed or decided. There is an inherent weakness in 
making uniting determinations hinge on the coincidence of the timing of the petition. 
What becomes the proper uniting if the Town should hereafter hire additional police 
supervisory personnel? Would Hart be removed from the PBA's unit for inclusion again 
in a separate unit of supervisors, or would the subsequently hired supervisors be 
included in the PBA's unit as was the lieutenant before them? Uniting by timing of the 
petition does not provide even guidance by which answers to these questions might be 
formulated. 
Before we would consider disestablishing the existing unit consisting of the 
lieutenant title and place that title within the PBA's unit, the record would have to reveal 
clearly both that there are no others in the police department with whom the lieutenant 
might share a community of interest4 and, if there are no such others employed at the 
present time who are eligible for representation, that the Town's intent is to leave any 
vacancies in the lieutenant's title or comparable supervisory positions permanently 
unfilled. Only then could it be fairly argued that the lieutenant must be placed into the 
PBA's unit to enable him to exercise rights granted by the Act. Even in those 
circumstances, there would still be a substantial question as to whether an otherwise 
inappropriate unit can become most appropriate if a covered employee were to be 
denied any realistic possibility for representation if not included in that unit. We do not 
decide that question because those circumstances are not present on this record. 
4The PBA argues that the chief of police is not a managerial employee. If the 
PBA is correct in its claim that the chief and the lieutenant are eligible for 
representation, then those two titles might constitute the appropriate unit. 
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Accordingly, the PBA's petition is appropriately dismissed, even if Hart were to be held 
eligible for representation. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: September 28, 1998 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Odessa-Montour Teachers 
Association (Association) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on the 
Association's charge against the Odessa-Montour Central School District (District). 
As relevant to the exceptions,1 the Association alleges that the District violated 
§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused 
to sign a collective bargaining agreement covering 1994-1997 as tendered by the 
Association. 
1The ALJ dismissed a direct dealing allegation and no exceptions have been 
filed to her decision and order in that respect. 
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A written memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the parties stated 
twice their admitted agreement to "no step movement" for salary purposes. However, 
the formal collective bargaining agreement which the Association submitted to the 
District for signature did not contain the quoted language, although the contractual 
salary schedules themselves reflect no movement on step for the years covered by that 
agreement. 
The ALJ held that the District did not violate the Act by refusing to sign the 
agreement submitted to it by the Association because that document did not contain the 
language from the MOU stating no step movement. As held by the ALJ: 
Where the parties' agreement, when reached, is set forth in words, a party 
has a right to have incorporated into the formal agreement the language 
on which any graphs, charts and schedules then created are based, 
(footnote omitted) Such language will normally define the agreement 
reached and intended to be reflected in the graphics. At the least, such 
language aids interpretation of the graphic for the term of the agreement 
and/or on expiration. 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in finding that there 
was no agreement between the parties which could be executed. The District argues 
that the Association's exceptions are misdirected because the ALJ held only, and 
correctly, that the District was not required to sign the agreement tendered by the 
Association because it was incomplete, not that there was no agreement between the 
parties. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's decision. In affirming, we endorse fully the language from the ALJ's decision 
previously quoted. 
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A party to a bargaining relationship is required under the Act to sign a written 
agreement on demand which accurately reflects the agreements actually reached in 
negotiations.2 A party has no duty to sign an agreement which is inaccurate in material 
respect. An agreement can be inaccurate for different reasons. For example, it may 
, include matters never negotiated or matters to which no agreement has been reached, 
or it may omit terms that have been settled. In this case, the agreement tendered to the 
District for signature is inaccurate because it omits a material term of the parties' mutual 
exchange of promises regarding step movement on the salary schedules. As the ALJ 
quite correctly observed, resolution of the dispute between these parties about the 
meaning and effect of their salary agreements might be aided by the inclusion of the 
language that the parties specifically agreed to in the MOU stating that there was to be 
no step movement. As the document which the District was asked to sign did not 
include this language, it did not reflect the totality of the parties' agreement, and as that 
omission was a material one, the District was not required to sign the agreement in the 
form submitted by the Association. 
As the only issue before us is whether the District was required to sign the 
agreement tendered to it by the Association, we express no opinion as to what the 
parties' salary agreement may require of the District or the Association, either during 
the term of that agreement or after its expiration. Similarly, given the basis for the ALJ's 
decision and our affirmance, there is no issue before us as to the parties' differing 
submissions of language for §33.1 (a) of the contractual salary article. 
2Act §204.3; Deer Park Teachers Ass'n, 13 PERB P048 (1984). 
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For the reasons set forth above, the Association's exceptions are denied and the 
ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: September 28, 1998 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Florida Union Free School 
District (District) to a decision of the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Assistant Director) sustaining a charge filed by the Florida 
Teachers Association, NYSUT/AFT No. 2973 (Association). The charge alleges that 
the District had violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it unilaterally discontinued coffee breaks for certain unit employees. The 
Assistant Director rejected the District's defenses that the Association had not 
demanded negotiations on coffee breaks, that the District was reverting to the terms of 
the parties' collective bargaining agreement, and that the charge should be deferred to 
the parties' contractual grievance procedure or dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
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Holding that the District had violated the Act as alleged, the Assistant Director ordered 
the coffee breaks restored and unit employees made whole for the loss of any pay 
occasioned by the elimination of the coffee breaks. 
The District excepts to the Assistant Director's decision, arguing that no practice 
oLallpwing.j:ojT^ 
terms of the parties' collective bargaining agreement concerning workday and that it 
was privileged to act pursuant to the language of the contractual management rights 
clause. The Association supports the Assistant Director's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the Assistant Director. 
The Association represents a unit of non-teaching employees in the District. The 
record establishes that clerical employees in the unit have been entitled for many years 
to a fifteen-minute coffee break every morning and a fifteen-minute coffee break every 
afternoon.1 On April 18, 1997, the secretary in the High School Guidance Department, 
Dorothy Ehlers, was told by her supervisor and the high school principal that she would 
no longer be allowed to take coffee breaks. No reason was given. Michael Siegel, the 
president of the Association, discussed the matter on several occasions with the 
District's Superintendent, Maureen Flaherty, but no agreement was reached. This 
charge was then filed. 
1The two secretaries in the elementary school, a separate building, are entitled to 
coffee breaks. One secretary takes advantage of the break time, one secretary does 
not. It appears they may still be allowed to take coffee breaks. There is no record 
evidence as to whether the high school principal's secretary, located in the same 
building as Ehlers, has taken, or still takes, coffee breaks. 
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The parties' collective bargaining agreement, effective for the term July 1, 1996 -
June 30, 1998, provides in relevant part: 
Article ll-Workday and Work Year 
A. Clerical 
1. The normal work day will be seven and one-half (7 Vz) 
hours per day (exclusive of lunch), five (5) days per 
week-Monday through Friday exclusive. The hours are to 
be established by the Superintendent based on the normal 
school day. 
Clerical employees will be entitled to a one-half ( Vz) hour 
lunch set by the building supervisor. 
2. Guidance Secretary-The normal workday will be seven 
and one-half hours (7 Vz) per day (exclusive of a Vz hour 
lunch set by the building supervisor). 
Paid time off, such as a coffee break, is a mandatory subject of negotiations.2 
The District argues that it has reverted to the language of the contract setting forth the 
workday, which provides only for a Vz hour lunch break for unit employees and does not 
include additional coffee break time. The District relies upon the decision in Maine-
Endwell Central School District, (hereafter Maine-Endwell).3 where the employer 
eliminated one of the teachers' duty-free periods and increased the length of the 
remaining periods. Its defense of its action rested upon a contractual provision which 
set the normal teaching day as "7 Vz hours as assigned by the [employer]". In Maine-
Endwell, the Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's decision which held: 
2Town of Clarence, 30 PERB 1J3011 (1997); Inr.. Village of Rockville Centre. 18 
PERB U3082(1985). 
315 PERB 1J3025 (1982), afEg 14 PERB 1J4625 (1981). 
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[T]he employer's obligation,... is to refrain from unilaterally 
changing not a practice, but a term and condition of 
employment. Where the contract is silent on a particular 
item, the past practice of the parties may be examined to 
determine the term and condition. (Footnote omitted) But 
when the parties have negotiated and reached an 
agreement on the item, the contract then defines the term 
and condition of employment, and actions taken pursuant 
thereto can no longer be labeled unilateral. In essence, the 
parties have, for the duration of the contract, waived their 
right to complain about such actions.4 
The Assistant Director found the District's reliance on Maine-Endwell to be 
misplaced, holding that here the relevant contract provision in these parties' contract 
did not preserve a right of assignment to the District as was the case in Maine-Endwell, 
and that the record reflected no bargaining history on the provision in issue. The 
Assistant Director's bases for distinguishing Maine-Endwell are nonpersuasive because 
neither one formed any part of the rationale which the Board adopted in Maine-Endwell. 
Even assuming that there has here been an abolition of a practice generally 
applicable to all unit employees, or that a change in practice applicable to only one unit 
employee is subject to redress under a charge alleging a unilateral change in a term 
and condition of employment, we disagree with the Assistant Director's conclusion that 
the District violated the Act. 
The District-Association contract covers the length of the unit employees' 
workday and duty-free time. The contract need not have addressed coffee breaks 
specifically to trigger a reversion defense because coffee breaks are merely a form of 
414 PERB 1J4625, at 4759 (1981), affd, 15 PERB 1J3025 (1982). See also. 
County of Livingston, 30 PERB P046 (1997); Town of Greece, 28 PERB 1J3078 (1995); 
State of New York-Unified Court Sys.. 26 PERB 1(3013 (1991). 
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break time from work during the workday, a subject already specifically covered by the 
parties' agreement. Ehlers, and other unit employees, may have received a benefit of 
break time over and above the benefit defined by the contract language. However, the 
terms and conditions of the unit employees have been fixed bilaterally through 
negotiations between the District and the Association. Those terms call for a workday 
of 7 1/4 hours with Vi hour off from work for lunch. The coffee breaks enjoyed by some 
unit employees afforded them more than the contractually provided break time and 
effectively reduced their workday to 7 hours. Both "practices" were contrary to the 
terms of the parties' agreement. The District was, therefore, not required to maintain 
the coffee break practice and it was privileged to revert to the terms of its collective 
bargaining agreement with the Association and eliminate the extra-contractual coffee 
breaks.5 
For the reasons set forth above, we grant the District's exceptions in relevant 
part and reverse the decision of the Assistant Director. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: September 28, 1998 
New York, New York 
lael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
5We need not reach the question of whether the District would be duty bound to 
negotiate the issue of coffee breaks upon demand by the Association, as that issue is 
not before us. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Malone Administrators 
Association (Association) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director) on its unit clarification/placement1 petition, which seeks to 
determine whether the position of Special Education and Remediation Coordinator 
1A unit clarification petition seeks only a factual determination as to whether a 
position is already included in a given unit. A unit placement petition seeks a 
determination as to the most appropriate uniting of a position not already in a unit under 
the criteria in §207 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
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(SERC) is in or should be placed into the unit of principals, assistant principals and 
directors the Association represents. The Malone Central School District (District) 
assigned the SERC position upon its creation to a unit represented by the Malone 
Federation of Teachers (Federation). The unit which the Federation represents 
includes teachers, department chairs, subject area coordinators, the assistant athletic 
director, instructional technology coordinator, school nurses and nurse coordinator. 
After a hearing, the Director dismissed the petition. The unit clarification aspect 
of the petition was dismissed upon the finding that the SERC is not actually 
encompassed within the Association's unit. The Director dismissed the unit placement 
aspect of the petition upon a conclusion that the SERC is most appropriately placed 
within the Federation's unit, where the District had initially assigned it, because the 
SERC has a much closer community of interest with employees in the Federation's unit 
than with the administrators in the Association's unit. 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the Director's decision rests on a 
selective and inaccurate statement of the record which caused the Director to reach a 
legally erroneous decision inconsistent with relevant case law. The Federation argues 
in response that the Association has distorted the record by its arguments. According 
to the Federation, the Director's decision accurately reflects the whole record and is 
consistent with prior decisions of this agency. The District has not filed any exceptions 
or a response. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
Director's decision. 
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The Association's contention is quite simple. The SERC, like the director of pupil 
services (DPS) whom the SERC replaced, is an administrator who belongs with other 
administrators in the Association's unit. The Director's decision to the contrary 
allegedly dismisses real conflicts of interest caused by including the SERC in the 
Federation's unit and ignores the SERC's shared community of interest with 
administrative personnel. The record, however, is not susceptible to any simplistic 
conclusions. 
The Director's decision accurately reflects in material respects a record which 
evidences that the several attributes of the SERC's employment resemble those of 
employees in both the Association's and the Federation's unit in different respects. 
After correctly concluding that the SERC was not, in fact, already included within the 
Association's title-specific unit, the Director went on to conclude that the SERC was not 
most appropriately removed from the Federation's unit and placed into the Association's 
unit. In reaching this conclusion, the Director did not fail or refuse to give consideration 
to the interests which the SERC has in common with the administrators in the 
Association's unit. The Director also observed differences between the SERC and the 
employees in the Federation's unit which cut against continuing the placement of the 
SERC in the Federation's unit. The Director nonetheless determined that the SERC, an 
educational coordinator and a teacher on special assignment, who did not have the 
same breadth of administrative and supervisory responsibilities as did the DPS, had a 
greater professional community of interest with the coordinators and other employees in 
the Federation's unit. 
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Any questions under a community of interest criterion as to the appropriateness 
of continuing the District's placement of the SERC in the Federation's unit are removed 
upon application of the "administrative convenience" uniting criteria in §207.1 (c) of the 
Act. That criterion requires weight be given to an employer's uniting preference. The 
District's implemented belief that the SERC is most appropriately placed in the 
Federation's unit should not be disturbed when that placement is at least as appropriate 
as would be one placing the SERC in the Association's unit. 
The Association's argument that the Director failed to follow or distinguish 
controlling precedent is rejected. The Association would effectively have us read other 
Director decisions involving similar positions as creating a rule, or at least a rebuttable 
presumption, that educational coordinators are most appropriately placed into units of 
administrators. As the Director correctly observed, however, uniting determinations are 
uniquely fact specific and they rarely lend themselves to inflexible rules. 
The cases relied upon by the Association2 were considered by the Director and 
found not to warrant the result the Association wants. The Director concluded that the 
positions at issue in those other cases were similar to the SERC's in certain respects, 
but different in others, and that those differences were substantial enough to distinguish 
the cases the Association relied upon. Having reviewed those cases, we agree with the 
Director's assessment. 
2Dunkirk City Sen. Dist., 30 PERB j[4002 (1997); Albany-Schoharie-Schenectady 
BQCES, 27 PERB 1J4049 (1994); Wayne-Finger Lakes BQCES, 26 PERB 1J4056 
(1993). 
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In summary, this record shows that the SERC has a community of interest with 
Federation unit employees who are responsible for the coordination of educational 
programs. There is no likelihood of any conflict of interest arising from continuing the 
inclusion of that title in the Federation's unit. As that uniting is appropriate and is the 
one consistent with the District's uniting preference, the Association's petition was 
properly dismissed by the Director. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is affirmed, and the 
Association's exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: September 28, 1998 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
rtfarc A. Abbott, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York (Office of 
Mental Health-Central New York Psychiatric Center) (State) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed by Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(Council 82). Council 82's charge alleges that the State violated §209-a.1 (d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally issued an interim1 
smoking policy containing a five-step disciplinary component. 
1The smoking bans and restrictions contained within the smoking policy were 
promulgated by the State in response to observed fire hazards during construction at 
; the psychiatric facility. 
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After a hearing, the ALJ held that the smoking policy was mandatorily negotiable 
in its entirety because of its disciplinary component, but not otherwise, and he ordered 
the smoking policy rescinded. 
The State argues that the ALJ erred in finding a violation of its duty to negotiate 
bemusejhe smpMngjDan 
and the disciplinary consequences for noncompliance with that policy were not proven 
to be changes in existing employment conditions. Council 82 has not filed any 
exceptions or a response. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's decision to the extent it concludes that the State violated the Act when it 
unilaterally promulgated the multi-step disciplinary component of the smoking policy, 
but reverse the ALJ's decision in other respects, and modify the remedial order. 
As the State suggests in its arguments, the negotiability of the disciplinary 
component of the smoking policy must be analyzed separately from the smoking bans 
and restrictions contained within the policy because the latter are plainly severable from 
the former. The smoking bans and restrictions can exist independently from an 
enforcement mechanism which relies upon employee discipline. More generally, the 
subject matter of an employer's directive to employees is not made mandatorily 
negotiable simply because the directive has an explicit or implicit employment sanction 
for noncompliance with the directive. All employer directives to employees carry with 
them, at least implicitly, the possibility of an employment consequence for 
noncompliance. As such, all employer directives to employees would be mandatory 
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subjects of negotiation as a matter of law if disciplinary consequence were the test of 
the negotiability of the directive itself. But that has never been the analytical approach 
this Board has taken. Usually, the negotiability of an employer's directive is to be 
assessed by its subject matter, separately from the means by which that directive is 
enforced. There may be times when disciplinary consequence might be a factor to be 
considered in assessing the negotiability of a given directive to employees, but never is 
disciplinary consequence the "test" of the negotiability of that directive. 
The ALJ concluded that the smoking policy was not mandatorily negotiable but 
for its disciplinary component and no exceptions were taken to that part of the ALJ's 
decision. Therefore, there is no issue before us as to whether the ALJ was correct in 
his assessment that the smoking bans and restrictions by themselves are not 
mandatorily negotiable. Accordingly, we do not express any opinion as to whether any 
of the smoking restrictions and bans contained within the State's policy are mandatorily 
negotiable subjects. 
As to the disciplinary component of the smoking policy, the grounds for 
employee discipline and the system through which discipline is administered are 
mandatorily negotiable subjects.2 The State argues only that its enforcement of the 
interim smoking policy was not changed from its enforcement of its earlier smoking 
policies. 
2Binghamton Civil Serv. Forum v. City of Binghamton, 44 N.Y.2d 23, 11 PERB 
) TJ7508(1978). 
Board - U-17355 -4 
The State had two smoking policies in place at the facility at different times 
before it adopted the interim policy at issue. Disciplinary consequence for 
noncompliance with those earlier policies was clearly implicit, if not explicit, in the 
statement within those policies that the no smoking rules were to be "strictly enforced 
by supervisors . . . ." Smoking in violation of the prevailing smoking policy was always a 
disciplinary offense such that promulgation of the 1995 smoking policy did not change 
the bases for the imposition of discipline.3 The disciplinary component under the new 
policy, however, still constitutes a clear change from the State's prior disciplinary policy 
because of the specificity of its system for the administration of penalties for violations 
of the policy. 
Employment consequence for noncompliance with the at-issue smoking policy is 
now a certainty, not a possibility, however likely, as it was under the prior smoking 
policies. Specific consequences are stated for violations of the no smoking policy, 
increasing with each violation from verbal counseling for a "first occurrence" to the 
issuance of a notice of discipline seeking the employee's termination from service for a 
"fifth occurrence". Moving from a generalized policy of "strict enforcement" of no 
smoking rules to a multi-step, nondiscretionary, progressive disciplinary system with 
automatically applied, penalties is a substantive and substantial change in the unit 
employees' terms and conditions of employment regarding discipline. If the State was 
to change from an undefined system of enforcement of prior smoking policies to a 
3Compare City of Buffalo (Police Dep't). 23 PERB 1J3050 (1990), where the 
; employer's action changed the grounds for the imposition of discipline. 
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detailed, compulsory system of enforcement, it was required to negotiate that decision. 
This does not mean that the State cannot warn or discipline employees for 
noncompliance with the interim smoking policy. Any action taken against an employee, 
however, must be pursuant to and in accordance with the disciplinary policy and 
practice as it existed before August 29, 1995, when the smoking policy at issue was _ 
promulgated. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is reversed to the extent it 
holds the promulgation of the smoking restrictions and bans themselves violated the 
State's duty to negotiate under the Act. The ALJ's decision is affirmed to the extent it 
holds that the State's promulgation of the disciplinary component of the August 29, 
1995 smoking policy violated the Act. Accordingly, the ALJ's remedial order is modified 
to provide as follows: 
1. Immediately rescind those parts of the interim smoking policy dated 
August 29, 1995, which list the employment consequences for each of the 
five enumerated violations of such policy. 
2. Immediately rescind any employment actions taken against any unit 
employee pursuant to the implementation of the August 29, 1995 interim 
smoking policy, which would not otherwise have been taken against such 
employee, and make unit employees whole for any employment 
consequences taken by application of the August 29, 1995 policy, which 
would not otherwise have been taken, with interest on any sum owing to any 
unit employee at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
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3. Post notice in the form attached at all places within the Central New York 
Psychiatric Center ordinarily used to post notices of information to employees 
in the unit represented by Council 82.4 
DATED: September 28, 1998 
_New_Y_ork,„N_ewJYork„ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
4The circumstances prompting the at-issue interim smoking policy do not warrant 
a unit-wide posting. 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the State of New York (Office of Mental Health-Central New York Psychiatric Center) (State) in the unit 
represented by Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO that the State will: 
1. Immediately rescind those parts of the interim smoking policy dated August 29, 1995, which list the 
employment consequences for each of the five enumerated violations of such policy. 
2. Immediately rescind any employment actions taken against any unit employee pursuant to the 
implementation of the August 29, 1995 interim smoking policy, which would not otherwise have been 
taken against such employee, and make unit employees whole for any employment consequences 
taken by application of the August 29, 1995 policy, which would not otherwise have been taken, with 
interest on any sum owing to any unit employee at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
State of New York (Office of Mental Health-
Central New York Psychiatric Center) 
this' Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by 
any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF CATTARAUGUS, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4680 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
LOUIS C. FULKERSON, for Petitioner 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Cattaraugus 
(County) to a decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing its petition to fragment the 140 nonsupervisory 
and support employees of the County's nursing homes from a County-wide unit of 610 
employees which is represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA), which opposes the petition. In dismissing the 
petition, the Director determined that there was no persuasive evidence in the parties' 
stipulated record of a compelling need for fragmentation of a unit existing since 1968. 
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The County excepts to the Director's decision, arguing that a unit of nursing 
home employees separate from all others is appropriate in the private sector and that 
the unique concerns of the health care industry make negotiating with nursing home 
employees within an overall unit administratively inconvenient. CSEA supports the 
Director's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
In support of its petition, the County relies upon the following. In December 
1996, after lengthy discussions with CSEA, the County reduced the number of Nurses 
Aides and Licensed Practical Nurses employed at its nursing homes. Approximately 
75% of the grievances CSEA files in the County are on behalf of nursing home 
employees. The County operates on a different fiscal year than that of the State of 
New York (State), from which it receives funding for the nursing homes. During 1997, 
the nursing homes were operating at a deficit until the County received its Inter-
Governmental Transfer funds from the State. The County also relies on a report 
compiled by the Center for Governmental Research entitled: "What Should Be Done 
With County Nursing Facilities in New York State?". The report sets forth certain 
challenges facing County-owned nursing homes in New York and proposes changes in 
nursing home operations. 
Initially, we note that the private sector decisions and publications referred to by 
the County in its exceptions concern the establishment of separate units of health-care 
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employees in initial uniting cases. This is a petition for fragmentation of a long-standing 
unit and, as such, the private sector precedent, never binding, has little relevance.1 
This Board has long adhered to two principles in deciding uniting questions. 
First, we have held that "[i]t is the policy of the Act to find appropriate the 
largest unit permitting for effective negotiations." (Footnote omitted) The 
second long-standing principle to which we have adhered is that 
fragmentation of existing bargaining units will not be granted in the 
absence of compelling evidence of the need to do so. (Footnote omitted) 
We have held that compelling need is generally established by proving the 
existence of a conflict of interest or inadequate representation. (Footnote 
omitted) When these principles have been applied in the creation and 
continuation of appropriate units, they have, at the very least, contributed 
to stability in public sector labor relations and have focused the parties' 
attention on substantive negotiations rather than on the process of adding 
to or subtracting from units.2 
Under this petition, the County seeks fragmentation of a long-standing unit 
without any evidence of either a conflict of interest between the different occupational 
groups in the existing unit or of inadequate representation of the nursing home 
employees by CSEA. Absent such evidence, the fragmentation sought by the County 
is contrary to our policy, in place since at least Town of Smithtown,3 disfavoring the 
disruption of the status quo absent good cause shown.4 The County argues, however, 
that the unit should be fragmented because its administrative convenience would be 
1Whetherthe standards articulated in those cases for initial uniting of health care 
employees would be utilized by this Board in an initial uniting case is a question not 
before us. 
2State of New York (Long Island Park, Recreation and Historical Preservation 
Comm'n), 22 PERB 1J3043, at 3098 (1989). 
38PERB 1J3015 (1975). 
Chautauqua County BOCES, 15 PERB 1J3126 (1982). 
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better served by negotiating with nursing home employees in a separate unit. In 
support, the County points to challenges facing County-owned nursing homes, 
particularly the "economic exigencies", as warranting a deviation from our long-
established standards in unit fragmentation cases. In this regard, the County excepts 
to the Director's reliance on the above-cited decisions and his "rote" application of them 
to the instant case. 
The Director found that the County's administrative convenience argument, while 
reflecting what, for it, would be easier negotiations, fell far short of the compelling need 
which would usually justify fragmentation of a long-standing unit. Implicit in the 
County's argument is the suggestion that while unit fragmentation may be inappropriate 
absent compelling need if the fragmentation is requested by a union and opposed by 
the employer, fragmentation is prima facie appropriate when requested by an employer 
and opposed by a union even without compelling need. The identity of the petitioner, 
however, cannot control the determination of the appropriate unit. Although an 
employer's administrative convenience is to be considered in resolving a unit question, 
it is merely one factor to be balanced against all relevant others in the determination of 
the most appropriate unit.5 This record simply does not establish that the problems 
recited by the County were caused by the existing unit structure or that the continuation 
of the existing unit would prevent or impede mitigation or resolution of these problems 
and issues of concern to the County. 
5City Sch. Dist. nf the City of Glen Cove, 19 PERB 1J3017 (1986), affg 18 PERB 
114085(1985). 
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There being no demonstrated compelling need to fragment the nursing home 
employees from the existing unit, the County's exceptions are denied and the decision 
of the Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: September 28, 1998 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc ATAbboft; Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NORTH GREECE FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, 
IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4758 
NORTH GREECE FIRE DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the North Greece Fire Fighters Association, 
IAFF, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All fulkime fire fighters of the North Greece Fire District holding the 
Civil Service Classification as Fire Fighter and Lieutenant. 
Excluded: Fire District Captain and all others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the North Greece Fire Fighters Association, IAFF, AFL-CIO. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 28, 1998 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
) STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
KENNETH SWART, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4535 
TOWN OF SAUGERTIES, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE, INC., 
Intervenor. 
FRANCELLO & VAN BENSCHOTEN (DAVID VAN BENSCHOTEN of counsel), 
for Petitioner 
QUALTERE, GRAHAM & REDDER (GEORGE W. REDDER of counsel), for 
Employer 
THOMAS P. HALLEY, ESQ., for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On May 1, 1996, Kenneth Swart (petitioner) filed a timely petition for 
decertification of the United Federation of Police, Inc. (intervenor), the current 
negotiating representative for employees in the following unit: 
Included: Part-time police officers and court officers. 
Excluded: Police administrator, secretary and all other police officers. 
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In the Matter of 
KENNETH SWART, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4535 
TOWN OF SAUGERTIES, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE, INC., 
Intervenor. 
FRANCELLO & VAN BENSCHOTEN (DAVID VAN BENSCHOTEN of counsel), 
for Petitioner 
QUALTERE, GRAHAM & REDDER (GEORGE W. REDDER of counsel), for 
Employer 
THOMAS P. HALLEY, ESQ., for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On May 1, 1996, Kenneth Swart (petitioner) filed a timely petition for 
decertification of the United Federation of Police, Inc. (intervenor), the current 
negotiating representative for employees in the following unit: 
Included: Part-time police officers and court officers. 
Excluded: Police administrator, secretary and all other police officers. 
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Upon consent of the parties, a mail ballot election was held on September 10, 
1998. The results of this election show that the majority of eligible employees in the 
unit who cast valid ballots no longer desire to be represented for purposes of 
collective negotiations by the intervenor.-
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor be, and it hereby is, 
decertified as the negotiating agent for the unit. 
DATED: September 28, 1998 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
- Of the 7 ballots cast, 0 were for representation and 7 against representation. 
There were no challenged ballots. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4765 
LIVERPOOL PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
Employer, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All regularly scheduled full and part-time employees of the 
Liverpool Public Library. 
Excluded: Library Director, Assistant Director, Secretary to the Director, 
Personnel Manager, Business Manager, Administrator of Public 
Services, Administrator of Support Services and substitutes. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ R D E [ _ _ _ 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
) agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 28, 1998 
New York, New York 
< ^ 
Michael R.Cuevas, Chairman 
/7k a /M? 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL 791, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASINO. C-4774 
GREECE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-




CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Greece Support Services Employees 
Association, NEA/NY, has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
) 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
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grievances. 
Unit: Included: All regularly employed Non-Instructional personnel in the following 
Departments: The Transportation Department, including substitutes therein; 
the Buildings and Grounds Department, including custodial; the Food Service 
Department; the Business Office; the Personnel Services Office; the 
Instructional Services Office; the Information Services Department; Central 
Stores; Print Shop; the Community Services Offices; and Continuing 
Ed ucation" Off iceT 
Excluded: District Administrators, Supervisors and Support Staff, substitutes and also 
High School Custodial Foreman, Supervisor of Central Stores, Transportation 
Assistant, Secretary of Support Services Director. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall negotiate 
collectively with the Greece Support Services Employees Association, NEA/NY. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 28, 1998 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
